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Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to present a paraconsistent formal system
and a corresponding intended interpretation according to which true con-
tradictions are not tolerated. Contradictions are, instead, epistemically
understood as conflicting evidence, where evidence for a proposition A
is understood as reasons for believing that A is true. The paper defines
a paraconsistent and paracomplete natural deduction system, called the
Basic Logic of Evidence (BLE), and extends it to the Logic of Evidence
and Truth (LETJ). The latter is a logic of formal inconsistency and un-
determinedness that is able to express not only preservation of evidence
but also preservation of truth. LETJ is anti-dialetheist in the sense that,
according to the intuitive interpretation proposed here, its consequence
relation is trivial in the presence of any true contradiction. Adequate se-
mantics and a decision method are presented for both BLE and LETJ ,
as well as some technical results that fit the intended interpretation.
1 Introduction
The distinctive feature of paraconsistent logics is that the principle of explo-
sion, according to which anything follows from a contradiction, does not hold,
thus allowing the acceptance of contradictions within a theory without falling
into triviality. Paraconsistency is the study of paraconsistent logics, both in
its technical and philosophical aspects. Dialetheism is the view according to
which there are true contradictions [see e.g. Priest and Berto, 2013]. The di-
aletheist claims that some contradictions are ontological in the sense that they
are due to some ‘inner contradictory essence of reality’ – or in other words,
that reality, in order to be correctly described, demands pairs of contradictory
propositions.1 Of course, endorsing a paraconsistent logic and being a dialethe-
ist are not the same thing: the latter implies the former, but not the other way
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1Although the dialetheist view has some antecedents in the history of philosophy, espe-
cially in Hegel and, according to some interpreters, also Heraclitus, the claim that there are
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round. One can be a paraconsistent logician without being a dialetheist, since
paraconsistent logics may be studied and developed without the commitment to
the truth of accepted contradictions. Another view in paraconsistency, that we
call metaphysical neutrality, ‘suspends judgement’ with respect to the nature
of contradictions. It is a somewhat pragmatic position: the fact that contradic-
tions occur in several contexts of reasoning is enough to justify a non-explosive
account of logical consequence, and there is no need to go into the metaphysical
question about the nature of such contradictions. A third position in paracon-
sistency, antagonistic to dialetheism, claims that no contradiction is ontological
but, rather, all contradictions that occur in scientific theories, belief systems, a
number of situations in informal reasoning, and even in semantic and set the-
oretical paradoxes – that are, strictly speaking, results about languages with
certain characteristics – have epistemic character in the sense that they are
related to thought and language. This is the position endorsed by us.
It is likely that no paraconsistent logician would be opposed to epistemic
contradictions. However, to the best of our knowledge, a paraconsistent formal
system suited to an intuitive reading according to which only epistemic contra-
dictions are allowed (and true contradictions are ‘prohibited’) is still lacking.
Our aim here is to present a system of this kind. In order to work out such an
account of paraconsistency we have to explain what it means to say that a pair
of propositions A and ¬A simultaneously ‘hold’, or ‘may be accepted’, without
being true.
According to the standard view, that can be traced back to Aristotle and
is to be found in virtually every book on elementary logic, the validity of an
inference is a matter of necessary preservation of truth. The essential property
of propositions, from the viewpoint of classical logic, is truth. Indeed, the more
effective way of prohibiting true contradictions is the principle of explosion that,
together with excluded middle, composes the deductive properties of classical
negation. But truth is not always the only property of propositions that matters.
In intuitionistic logic, for example, the property at stake is not only truth but
truth together with the availability of a constructive proof. Thus, there may
be a proposition A such that both A and ¬A do not hold because there is no
proof for any of them. Given the soundness of the system, a proof of A entails
the truth of A, but it may be the case that A has been proved true by non-
constructive means although there is no constructive proof of A. Notice that
the following situation is perfectly feasible: given two propositions A and ¬A,
exactly one of them is true, but from a constructivist point of view neither holds
because there is no proof available for A or for ¬A. Such a view combines a
realistic notion of truth with a notion of constructive proof that is essentially
epistemic.2
‘ontological contradictions’ is rather contentious, both inside and outside philosophy. It is not
our aim here, however, to discuss the legitimacy of, nor argue against, dialetheism.
2We defend this view in Carnielli and Rodrigues [2016]. It is not unlikely that a view that
accepts a non-constructive proof of the truth of a given proposition, but distinguishes such
a proof from a perhaps more informative constructive proof, is the predominant approach to
intuitionism nowadays [see Dubucs, 2008].
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In the case of a non-dialetheist paraconsistent logic the situation is dual.
There may be a proposition A such that it is not the case that both A and
¬A are true, but in some sense both hold in a given context. In this case, the
essential question Q is the following:
Q: what property are we going to ascribe to a pair of accepted
contradictory propositions such that it would be possible
for a proposition to enjoy it without being true?
Such a property has to be something weaker than truth. If we want to reject the
principle of explosion together with dialetheism, without assuming a position of
metaphysical neutrality, we have to give a convincing answer toQ . Our proposal
is that the notion of evidence is well suited to be such an answer.
The main aim of this paper is to present a paraconsistent formal system,
that we call the Logic of Evidence and Truth (LETJ), and an anti-dialetheist
explanation of it according to which contradictions are understood epistemi-
cally as conflicting evidence and true contradictions are not allowed. Section 2
briefly discusses the notion of evidence in order to show that it is an appropriate
answer to question Q above. Section 3 presents a paracomplete and paracon-
sistent natural deduction system for a logic we call BLE, (the Basic Logic of
Evidence), whose inference rules are intended to preserve evidence, not truth.
Neither excluded middle nor explosion hold in BLE because evidence can be in-
complete as well as contradictory.3 Section 4 is dedicated to extending BLE to a
logic we call LETJ (Logic of Evidence and Truth based on positive intuitionistic
sentential logic). LETJ is a logic of formal inconsistency and undeterminedness
that extends BLE by adding resources to express that a particular formula A
behaves classically: a unary sentential connective ◦ is added to the language of
BLE, and ◦A recovers explosion and excluded middle for A. A valuation seman-
tics, a decision method and some technical results for BLE and LETJ will be
presented.4 Finally, in Section 5, we face some issues related to paraconsistency
as preservation of evidence.
2 On the notion of evidence
There are a number of circumstances in which we have to deal with pairs of
propositions A and ¬A such that there are reasons for accepting and/or believing
3BLE, although differently motivated, turns out to be equivalent to the well-known Nelson’s
logic N4. (See also Section 5.3, and footnotes 11 and 21.) All the technical results presented
here with respect to BLE, including a valuation semantics and a decision method, also hold
for N4. In a Fregian spirit, we may say that N4 and BLE are two different names, with
different senses, that happen to have the same reference.
4In van Benthem and Pacuit [2011] and in van Benthem et al. [2015] we find a proposal
of ‘evidence logics’, designed to give an account of “epistemic agents faced with possibly
contradictory evidence from different sources”. Their approach is mainly semantical, in terms
of ‘neighborhood semantics’ and differs from ours, motivated by proof-theoretical insights.
The resulting logics proposed by them are quite different from both BLE and LETJ presented
here.
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in both. It does not mean that both are true, nor that we actually believe that
both are true. However, in such circumstances, although there may be nothing
conclusive with respect to the truth-value of A, we still wish to draw inferences
in the presence of both A and ¬A.5 The acceptance of A and ¬A can be
understood as some kind of ‘conflicting information’ about A, in the sense of
having non-conclusive reasons for accepting the truth as well as the falsity of
A. This kind of ‘conflicting information’ we call here conflicting evidence. Let
the falsity of A be represented by ¬A. So,
‘evidence that A is true’ means ‘reasons for believing in/accepting A’;
‘evidence that A is false’ means ‘reasons for believing in/accepting ¬A’.
There may be evidence that A is true even if A is false. Conflicting evidence oc-
curs when reasons for accepting A and ¬A are simultaneous and non-conclusive.
Conclusive evidence is evidence that establishes conclusively the truth (or the
falsity) of A, and eliminates any opposed non-conclusive evidence. Typical cases
of conflicting evidence, in the sense explained above, are the following. You may
ask two different but reliable doctors about the cause of some symptoms and get
two different and incompatible diagnoses. Another example: two witnesses may
deliver two contradictory statements regarding some point that is crucial to the
judge’s final decision. Supposing, again, that both are reliable, it may be said
that there are reasons for believing both A and ¬A, although only one of them
is true. The idea of non-conclusive versus conclusive evidence is well illustrated
in theories about empirical phenomena. A good example is the conflict between
classical mechanics and the theory of electromagnetic field, that are in the origin
of Einstein’s special relativity [see Carnielli and Rodrigues, 2016]. Actually, it
is not uncommon that two different scientific theories, successful in describing
and predicting a class of phenomena, may yield contradictory results in some
specific situations.6
The use we make here of the notion of evidence is close to the way evidence
in understood in epistemology. In Kelly [2014] we read that evidence “is the
kind of thing which can make a difference to what one is justified in believing
or ... what it is reasonable for one to believe” and later he adds that since
“evidence is the sort of thing which confers justification ... it is natural to
think that ‘reason to believe’ and ‘evidence’ are more or less synonymous.” The
link between ‘evidence’ and ‘reasons to believe’ is also clear in the ‘principle
of reasonable belief’, presented by Achinstein [2010a]: if, in the light of back-
ground information Φ, κ is evidence that A, then, given Φ, κ is a good reason
5The logic of evidence proposed by us does not intend to represent cognitive relations
between agents and propositions. It is not an account of any kind of propositional attitude.
The idea is that there is some objective criterion that, when satisfied, indicates the existence
of evidence for a proposition A. So, again, there can be evidence for A and an agent may be
aware of such evidence and still does not believe in A. Evidence, thus, is not a name for the
epistemic attitude of an agent w.r.t. a proposition. We say that our approach is epistemic
because the property of propositions that is being preserved is an epistemic notion.
6There are several examples in the literature – see, for example, da Costa and French [2003,
chapter 5] and Nickles [2002].
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for believing A. Achinstein also distinguishes potential evidence from veridical
evidence. Roughly speaking, an evidence κ for a proposition A is veridical if A
is true and there is an ‘explanatory connection’ between A and κ (this means, as
we understand it, that κ establishes conclusively the truth of A). On the other
hand, κ may be potential evidence for A, even if A is false. Achinstein’s notions
of potential and veridical evidence are close to what we call here, respectively,
evidence simpliciter (non-conclusive) and conclusive evidence.
It is important to call attention to the fact that evidence, in the sense used
here, is always external to the formal system. We are not formalizing the notion
of evidence, nor will we present a ‘semantics of evidence’.7 The aim of section 3
is to give an account of the deductive behaviour of the sentential connectives
from the point of view of preservation of evidence, instead of preservation of
truth: an inference is taken to be valid just in case there cannot exist evidence
for the premises without evidence for the conclusion. What constitutes evidence
depends on the area of study and the subject matter, and this is not a problem
of logic. Actually, it is not surprising that there is no unified account of what
constitutes evidence for a given proposition A [see Achinstein, 2010b]. What
kind of thing constitutes non-conclusive or conclusive evidence varies for the
physicist, chemist, archaeologist and so on.
3 A logic of evidence
The aim of this section is to devise a paraconsistent formal system suited to
the reading of contradictions as conflicting evidence. What we will do here
has an analogy to the inference rules for intuitionistic logic, when the latter
is understood epistemically as concerned with the availability of a constructive
proof. Natural deduction rules are particularly well suited to expressing the
intuitionistic way of constructing proofs. Roughly speaking, the basic idea of
the Brouwer-Heyting-Kolmogorov (BHK ) interpretation is that an inference
rule is valid if it transforms constructive proofs for one or more premises into
a constructive proof of the conclusion. Here, analogously, the guiding idea is
the following: supposing the availability of evidence for the premises, we ask
whether an inference rule yields a conclusion for which evidence is also available.
As we have seen, (i) the falsity of A is represented here by ¬A, (ii) ‘evidence
that A is true’ is understood as ‘reasons for accepting/believing in A’, and (iii)
‘evidence that A is false’ means ‘reasons for accepting/believing in ¬A’. So,
‘A holds’ means ‘there is evidence that A is true’;
‘A does not hold’ means ‘there is no evidence that A is true’;
‘¬A holds’ means ‘there is evidence that A is false’;
7Melvin Fitting, in a forthcoming paper [Fitting, 2016], proposes a formalization of the
notion of evidence that includes an embedding of the logic BLE into the modal logic KX4,
that is S4 minus A → A plus A → A. In the well-known embedding of intuitionistic
logic in S4,  represents provability; dually, in the embedding of BLE into KX4,  represents
evidence which, in contrast to proof, permits contradictions.
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‘¬A does not hold’ means ‘there is no evidence that A is false’.
Accordingly, the following scenarios may be described with respect to a propo-
sition A:
1. No evidence at all: both A and ¬A do not hold.
2. Only evidence that A is true: A holds, ¬A does not hold.
3. Only evidence that A is false: ¬A holds, A does not hold.
4. Conflicting evidence: both A and ¬A hold.
Thus, the formal system we are looking for must be not only paraconsistent but
also paracomplete: neither the principle of explosion nor excluded middle should
hold. The next section examines which natural deduction rules are suitable
for expressing the propagation of evidence through implication, conjunction,
disjunction, and negation.
3.1 A natural deduction system for preservation of evi-
dence
Let L0 be a language with a denumerable set of propositional letters {p0, p1,
p2, ...}, parentheses, and closed under the connectives in the set {¬,∧, ∨,→}.
The set S0 of formulas of L0 is obtained recursively in the usual way. Roman
capitals stand for meta-variables for formulas of L0. The definition of a deriva-
tion D of A from a set Γ of premises is the usual one for natural deduction
systems.
A complete natural deduction system for classical propositional logic is de-
fined by adding to the introduction and elimination rules for →, ∨ and ∧ the
rules of explosion and excluded middle below:
A ¬A
B
EXP and
[A]
....
B
[¬A]
....
B
B
PEM.
By dropping the rules above and keeping only the introduction and elimination
rules for →, ∨ and ∧, we get positive intuitionistic propositional logic (PIL).
We start with PIL, arguing that it is able to express the notion of preservation
of evidence.
A B
A ∧B ∧I
A
A ∨B ∨I
B
A ∨B
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[A]
....
B
A→ B → I
A ∧B
A
∧E A ∧B
B
A ∨B
[A]
....
C
[B]
....
C
C
∨E
A→ B A
B
→ E
With respect to PIL, the availability of evidence is analogous to availability of
proof. As usual in natural deduction systems, [A] means that the hypothesis A
has been discharged (or canceled). An evidence-interpretation for the introduc-
tion rules for ∧ and ∨ is straightforward. If κ and κ′ are evidence, respectively,
for A and B, κ and κ′ together constitute evidence for A ∧ B.8 Similarly, if κ
constitutes evidence for A, then κ is also evidence for any disjunction that has
A as one disjunct. The rule → I deserves some remarks. When the supposition
that there is evidence κ for A leads to the conclusion that there is evidence κ′
for B, this is itself evidence for A → B. Notice that → does not demand any
relation between the contents or meanings of A and B. If there is evidence for
B, we may conclude that there is also evidence for A → B, for any A. The
implication, therefore, works analogously to both classical and BHK interpre-
tation: if B is true, A→ B is also true; if there is a construction of B, there is
a construction of A → B. Up to this point, this takes care of the introduction
rules.
8The logic of evidence proposed by us is adjunctive because we want to express a notion
of preservation of evidence for which ∧-introduction holds in general. Suppose a document
is (non-conclusive) evidence for the truth of A, i.e. such a document is evidence κ for A.
Now, suppose that from another source comes another document that is (also non-conclusive)
evidence for the falsity of A. The latter would be an evidence κ′ for ¬A. We can, of course, put
these two documents together, say, in a folder, or even merge them in an electronic file. These
two pieces of evidence κ and κ′ together are evidence that the conjunction A ∧ ¬A is true.
So, it is not the case that evidence for the latter fails when there is conflicting evidence for A.
Such a situation, evidence for A∧¬A, is nothing but an indication that further investigation is
necessary. This is a central point of the non-dialetheist approach to paraconsistency proposed
by us: it may be that evidence for a contradiction is available, but only as an indication that
something is wrong and should be fixed.
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The elimination rules may be obtained from the introduction rules. Gentzen
[1935, p. 80] famously remarks that “The introductions represent, as it were,
the ‘definitions’ of the symbols concerned, and the eliminations are no more, in
the final analysis, than the consequences of these definitions”. Prawitz [1965,
p. 33] has put this idea more precisely in the so-called inversion principle. We
reformulate Prawitz’ inversion principle in terms of evidence as follows:
Evidence inversion principle
Let α be an application of an elimination rule that has B as consequence.
Then, any κ that is evidence for the major premise of α, when combined
with evidence for the minor premises of α (if any), already constitutes
evidence for B; the existence of evidence for B is thus obtainable directly
from the existence of evidence for the premises, without the addition of α.
We thus easily gain the respective elimination rules which do preserve availabil-
ity of evidence. For the sake of an example, let us take a look at ∧E. If some
evidence κ for A ∧ B is available, κ would be, or would ‘contain’ evidence for
A, as well as for B. Analogous reasoning apply to the other rules.
Up to this point we have what could be called a positive logic of preservation
of evidence. PIL is well suited to express both preservation of evidence and
the (positive) BHK interpretation. It is worth noting that the introduction
and elimination rules for conjunction, implication and disjunction, therefore,
preserve a notion stronger than truth (constructive proof) as well as a notion
weaker than truth (evidence).
3.2 Negation
A central issue in paraconsistency is that of specifying a negation without (some
of) the properties of classical negation but that still retains enough properties to
be termed a negation. As discussed in the beginning of section 3, the principle
of explosion and excluded middle do not hold from the viewpoint of preservation
of evidence. Another property of classical negation that must be invalid is the
so-called introduction of negation:
A→ B,A→ ¬B ` ¬A. (1)
The reason is that any extension of PIL in which introduction of negation holds
is able to prove that for any A and B:
A,¬A ` ¬B, (2)
that is, from a contradiction, any negated proposition follows, which is an un-
desirable result for a paraconsistent system.9 Besides, and more importantly,
the introduction of negation does not fit the intuitive interpretation in terms of
9A paraconsistent system in which explosion does not hold but A,¬A ` ¬B holds is called
partially explosive. An example of a partially explosive formal system is Kolmogorov’s ‘logic
of judgment’ [see Kolmogorov, 1925].
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evidence, since there may be a circumstance such that there is evidence for B
and for ¬B, and so also for A→ B and A→ ¬B, but no evidence for ¬A.
Now we turn to rules in which the conclusion is a negation of a conjunction,
a disjunction or an implication. Natural deduction rules for concluding falsities
may be obtained in a way similar to the rules for concluding truths. The point
is that instead of asking about the conditions of assertibility, we ask about the
conditions of refutability [cf. Lo´pez-Escobar, 1972]. An example of a natural
deduction rule whose conclusion is the falsity of a conjunction is the following
¬A
¬(A ∧B)
.
This rule is obtained by asking what would be sufficient conditions for refuting a
conjunction. We now apply an analogous idea, asking what would be sufficient
conditions for having evidence for the falsity of a conclusion. If κ is evidence
that A is false, κ constitutes evidence that A ∧ B is false – mutatis mutandis
for B. Analogous reasoning for ∨ and → gives the following introduction rules:
¬A
¬(A ∧B) ¬ ∧ I
¬B
¬(A ∧B)
.
¬A ¬B
¬(A ∨B) ¬ ∨ I.
A ¬B
¬(A→ B) ¬ → I.
Elimination rules are obtained by applying the evidence inversion principle men-
tioned above.
¬(A ∨B)
¬A ¬ ∨ E
¬(A ∨B)
¬B .
¬(A→ B)
A
¬ → E ¬(A→ B)¬B
,
¬(A ∧B)
[¬A]
....
C
[¬B]
....
C
C
¬ ∧ E.
Indeed, let us take a look at rule ¬ → E. When κ is evidence that a formula
A → B is false, κ must also be evidence for the truth of the antecedent A and
for the falsity of the consequent B.10
The validity of double negation,
A
¬¬A DN
¬¬A
A
,
10Notice that the negation rules exhibit a symmetry with respect to the corresponding
assertion rules for the dual operators.
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is perhaps not so clear as the other rules, but we claim that in both directions
DN fits an intuitive notion of evidence. The rules above relate, in a perspicuous
way, evidence that a proposition A is true and evidence that A is false. Suppose
κ is evidence that A is true. It is reasonable to see κ as evidence that it is false
that A is false. Now suppose, conversely, that κ is evidence that it is false that
A is false. Again, it is reasonable that κ also constitutes evidence that A is true.
Let us call the logic defined by the rules DN, introduction and elimination
for →, ∨ and ∧, plus introduction and elimination for negated →, ∨ and ∧,
the Basic Logic of Evidence (BLE ). BLE faithfully represents preservation of
evidence when the latter is understood as reasons for believing the truth/falsity
of propositions, as explained in section 2 above.11
Lemma 1. The following properties hold for BLE:
P1. Reflexivity: if A ∈ Γ, then Γ ` A;
P2. Monotonicity: if Γ ` B, then Γ, A ` B, for any A;
P3. Transitivity (cut): if ∆ ` A and Γ, A ` B, then ∆,Γ ` B;
P4. Deduction theorem: if Γ, A ` B, then Γ ` A→ B;
P5. Compactness: if Γ ` A, then there is ∆ ⊆ Γ, ∆ finite such that ∆ ` A.
Proof. The properties P1, P2, P3 and P5 are direct consequences of the def-
inition of a deduction of A from premises in Γ. The deduction theorem (P4 )
amounts to the rule →-introduction.
Since its consequence relation is reflexive, monotonic and transitive (prop-
erties P1, P2 and P3 ), BLE is thus a Tarskian or standard logic.
3.3 A semantics for BLE
Some logics allow for a semantics with an intuitive appeal independent of the
corresponding deductive system. This is the case, for example, of the truth-
tables for classical logic and the possible-worlds semantics for alethic modal
logic. Indeed, these semantics do provide an insight into these logics because
it really seems that the semantic clauses ‘make sense’ independently of the
inference rules and/or axioms. And it is of course a relevant matter to show that
the semantics and the deductive system are two different ways of determining the
same set of valid inferences. On the other hand, the semantics to be presented
here for BLE is not intended to have any intuitive appeal independent of the
deductive system. Rather, such semantics should be seen as a mathematical tool
capable of representing the inference rules in such a way that some technical
11The rules for negation are the same as the rules for constructive falsity presented by
Prawitz [1965, pp. 96-97]. Although the guiding idea that led us to BLE is different, BLE
can be easily proved equivalent to Nelson’s logic N4 (see Fact 10). Besides, BLE is also
equivalent to the propositional fragment of refutability calculus presented by Lo´pez-Escobar
[1972].
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results may be proved, not only for BLE but also for LETJ , an extension of
BLE that will be seen in section 4. The ‘meaning’ of the logic BLE is given
by the fact that its rules preserve evidence.12 In what follows, the values 0
and 1 are better seen as labels that intend to be faithful to the inference rules.
Ascribed to a formula A, they mean, respectively, that A does not hold and that
A holds. So, according to the explanation in terms of evidence given in section
3,
v(A) = 1 means ‘there is evidence that A is true’;
v(A) = 0 means ‘there is no evidence that A is true’;
v(¬A) = 1 means ‘there is evidence that A is false’;
v(¬A) = 0 means ‘there is no evidence that A is false’.
The valuation semantics presented below is sound, complete, and yields a deci-
sion procedure for BLE.
Definition 2. A semivaluation s for BLE is a function from the set S of for-
mulas to {0, 1} such that:
1. if s(A) = 1 and s(B) = 0, then s(A→ B) = 0;
2. if s(B) = 1, then s(A→ B) = 1;
3. s(A ∧B) = 1 iff s(A) = 1 and s(B) = 1;
4. s(A ∨B) = 1 iff s(A) = 1 or s(B) = 1;
5. s(A) = 1 iff s(¬¬A) = 1;
6. s(¬(A ∧B)) = 1 iff s(¬A) = 1 or s(¬B) = 1;
7. s(¬(A ∨B)) = 1 iff s(¬A) = 1 and s(¬B) = 1;
8. s(¬(A→ B)) = 1 iff s(A) = 1 and s(¬B) = 1;
Definition 3. A valuation for BLE is a semivaluation for which the condition
below holds:
(Val) For all formulas of the form A1 → (A2 → ...→ (An → B)...) with B not
of the form C → D:
if s(A1 → (A2 → ... → (An → B)...)) = 0, then there is a semivaluation
s′ such that for every i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, s(Ai) = 1 and s(B) = 0.
12In the so-called proof-theoretic semantics, the notion of proof is semantical in the sense
that it gives the ‘meanings’ involved in the inferences of the formal system. Our approach has
a similar spirit.
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We say that a valuation v is a model of Γ (v  Γ) if for all B ∈ Γ, v(B) =
1; v  A means that v(A) = 1. Logical consequence in BLE is defined as
follows: Γ  A if and only if for every valuation v, if v is a model of Γ, then
v(A) = 1. It is also worth noting that this semantics shows that BLE is not
compositional, in the sense that the semantic value of a complex formula is not
functionally determined by the semantic values of its component parts. Indeed,
this semantics may be represented by the so-called quasi-matrices.13 Let us see
an example below.
Example 4. A ∨ (A→ B) is invalid in BLE.
A 0 1
B 0 1 0 1
A→ B 0 1 1 0 1
A ∨ (A→ B) 0 1 1 1 1
s1 s2 s3 s4 s5
The subformula A → B receives 0 in the semivaluation s1. The latter is not
excluded by condition Val (that is, it is a legitimate valuation) because there
is a semivaluation s such that s(A) = 1 and s(B) = 0, namely, s4. Notice that
the formula A ∨ (A → B), added to PIL, yields positive classical propositional
logic.
The semantic clauses are intended to represent the deductive properties of
the formal system in terms of the semantic values 0 and 1. It is not difficult to see
a correspondence between the inference rules and the clauses 3–8 of Definition 2,
for disjunction, conjunction and negation. The clauses for implication deserve
some remarks. Implication is defined by clauses 1 and 2 of Definition 2 plus
condition Val of Definition 3. Clause 1 expresses the fact that if v(A) = 1 and
v(B) = 0, it cannot be that v(A → B) = 1, since it would contradict modus
ponens. Clause 2 expresses the fact that v(B) = 1 implies that v(A→ B) = 1.
Clause Val establishes the equivalence between Γ, A  B and Γ  A → B.
In order to see how this works, notice that without the clause Val we cannot
guarantee the validity of  A→ (B → A).14
Example 5. A→ (B → A) is valid in BLE.
1 A 0 1
2 B 0 1 0 1
3 B → A 0 1 0 1 1
4 A→ (B → A) 0 1 1 0 1 1 1
s1 s2 s3 s4 s5 s6 s7
13As far as we know, non-functional valuation semantics (and the respective quasi-matrices)
for paraconsistent logics were presented for the first time by da Costa and Alves [1977] where
we find a sound and complete semantics for da Costa’s C1. The notion of semivaluation was
introduced in Loparic [1986], where we find semantic clauses for an intuitionistic implica-
tion. In Loparic [1986] and Loparic [2010] we find adequate valuation semantics and decision
procedures respectively for Cω and Heyting intuitionistic logic.
14The conditions for implication are ‘global’ in the sense that one has to look at all semi-
valuations in order to establish whether a given semivaluation is a valuation.
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Some semivaluations at line 4 need to be excluded: s1 and s4 do not satisfy
condition Val and therefore are not valuations. So, the formula receives 1 under
every valuation (namely s2, s3, s5, s6 and s7) and is thus valid.
3.3.1 Soundness
Theorem 6. If Γ ` A, then Γ  A.
Proof. We show by induction on the length of a derivation D with premises in
Γ and conclusion A, that Γ  A holds.
Base: if D has one element A, it means {A} ` A. So, A ∈ Γ, and Γ  A.
Inductive step. For each rule, the inductive hypothesis says that there are sound
derivations for the premise(s). The rest of the proof consists in showing that
the derivation obtained by the application of the rule is sound. Details of this
routine proof are left to the reader.
3.3.2 Completeness
Theorem 7. If Γ  A, then Γ ` A.
Proof. Completeness is achieved by means of a Henkin-style proof. Suppose
Γ 0 A. An A-saturated set ∆ is obtained from Γ by means of a Lindenbaum
construction in the usual way. The following propositions, corresponding to
clauses 1 to 8 of Definition 2 plus condition (Val) of Definition 3, can be proved:
(1′) if A ∈ ∆ and B /∈ ∆, then A→ B /∈ ∆;
(2′) if B ∈ ∆, then A→ B ∈ ∆;
(3′) A ∧B ∈ ∆ iff A ∈ ∆ and B ∈ ∆;
(4′) A ∨B ∈ ∆ iff A ∈ ∆ or B ∈ ∆;
(5′) A ∈ ∆ iff ¬¬A ∈ ∆;
(6′) ¬(A ∧B) ∈ ∆ iff ¬A ∈ ∆ or ¬B ∈ ∆;
(7′) ¬(A ∨B) ∈ ∆ iff ¬A ∈ ∆ and ¬B ∈ ∆;
(8′) ¬(A→ B) ∈ ∆ iff A ∈ ∆ and ¬B ∈ ∆;
(V al′) If ∆ is A-saturated and A1 → (A2 → ... → (An → B)...) /∈ ∆, then
there is a B -saturated set ∆′ such that ∆ ∪ {A1, A2, ...An} ⊆ ∆′.
The proofs of (1′) to (8′) are straightforward. In order to prove (V al′), suppose
A1 → (A2 → ... → (An → B)...) /∈ ∆ and ∆ is A-saturated. So, ∆ 0 A1 →
(A2 → ... → (An → B)...), and consequently ∆ ∪ {A1, A2, ...An} 0 B. A
B -saturated set ∆′ may be obtained from ∆ ∪ {A1, A2, ...An} by means of a
Lindenbaum construction.
13
Consider now the characteristic function v of the set ∆: in view of clauses
1′ to 8′ and V al′, v is a valuation for BLE and v is a model for ∆15. Since
Γ ⊆ ∆, v is also a model for Γ. But v(A) = 0, so Γ 2 A. By contraposition,
completeness is thus obtained.
3.3.3 A decision procedure for BLE
In Examples 4 and 5 above we have seen how all possible valuations involved
could be checked effectively by means of quasi-matrices. This depends essen-
tially on the fact that in order to determine whether A follows from (finite) Γ,
it is enough to check a finite number of valuations involving only subformulas
and negated subformulas of Γ ∪ {A}.
Theorem 8. Derivability in BLE is decidable.
Proof. From Lemma 1 item 5, derivability in BLE is compact. Given a deriva-
tion D of A from a (possibly infinite) set Γ, there will always be a finite set
Γ0 such that Γ0 contains precisely the hypotheses of D. Let Sub∗ be the set
of subformulas and negated subformulas of the formulas in Γ0 ∪ {A}. The set
Sub∗ is finite, and a valuation depends on no more than the formulas in Sub∗.
Consequently, the corresponding quasi-matrix is finite. So, checking clauses 1–8
of Definition 2 and the clause Val of Definition 3 is clearly computable. Hence,
in view of completeness and soundness, derivability in BLE is decidable.
There is also an interesting result about BLE that we call ‘grounding of
contradictoriness’. Roughly, it says that there can be no contradiction at all,
unless there is some contradiction in the atomic level.
Fact 9. A compound formula A is contradictory in a valuation v (i.e. v(A) = 1
and v(¬A) = 1) only if at least one atom p that occurs in A is contradictory in
v.
Proof. Suppose there is a valuation v such that v(A) = v(¬A) = 1. By induction
on the complexity of A, we prove that there is at least one atom p that occurs
in A such that v(p) = v(¬p) = 1.
Base case: A = p. Clearly, v(A) = v(¬A) = v(p) = v(¬p) = 1.
Inductive step. We prove the case in which A = B → C.
Inductive hypothesis: if v(B) = v(¬B) = 1, then there is a p in B such that
v(p) = v(¬p) = 1; mutatis mutandis for C. Suppose v(B → C) = v(¬(B →
C)) = 1. So, by clauses 1 and 8 of Definition 2, v(B) = v(C) = v(¬C) = 1.
Now, apply the inductive hypothesis. We leave the remaining cases to the
reader.
Notice, however, that the converse does not hold: there may be a contradictory
atom p in a formula A without A being contradictory. Let A be the formula
15Notice that v is a semivaluation that satisfies condition V al, given V al′, and is thus a
valuation.
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p ∨ q and consider the valuation v such that v(p) = v(¬p) = 1, v(q) = 1 and
v(¬q) = 0. In this case, v(p ∨ q) = 1 but v(¬(p ∨ q)) = 0.
It is also worth noting that the dual of Fact 9 with respect to undetermined
formulas does not hold: there may be compound formulas A and valuations v
such that v(A) = 0 and v(¬A) = 0, although there is no atom p in A such that
v(p) = 0 and v(¬p) = 0. For example, it may be that v(p → q) = v(¬(p →
q)) = 0 for v(p) = 0, v(¬p) = 1, v(q) = 0 and v(¬q) = 1 according to clauses 1
and 8 of Definition 2. In this aspect, BLE differs from intuitionistic logic.
Although it is almost obvious that BLE is equivalent of N4, for the sake of
clarity we prove the fact below.
Fact 10. BLE is equivalent to Nelson’s logic N4.
Proof. The equivalence between N4 and BLE is straightforward from the nat-
ural deduction system for N4 presented by Wansing and Kamide [2015, sec.
2.4]. The latter slightly differs from the system we adopted in the negation
rules (Section 3.2). Clearly, the rules ¬ ∧ I, ¬ ∨ I, ¬ → I, ¬ ∨ E, ¬ → E are
respectively equivalent in each system. The only case deserving attention is the
equivalence between Wansing and Kamide’s rule ¬ ∧ E (call it R1)
¬(A ∧B)
¬A ∨ ¬B R1
and ours (call it R2)
¬(A ∧B)
[¬A]
....
C
[¬B]
....
C
C
R2.
(i) In order to get R1 from R2, make C = ¬A∨¬B. The latter is obtained from
¬A (resp. ¬B) by ∨I:
¬(A ∧B)
[¬A]
¬A ∨ ¬B ∨I
[¬B]
¬A ∨ ¬B ∨I
¬A ∨ ¬B R2.
(ii) On the other hand, we get R2 from R1 by means of obtaining C from
¬A ∨ ¬B through ∨E:
¬(A ∧B)
¬A ∨ ¬B R1
[¬A]
....
C
[¬B]
....
C
C
∨E.
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4 A logic of evidence and truth
Although the logic BLE is able to express preservation of evidence, it is not able
to express preservation of truth. However, in some contexts of reasoning we deal
simultaneously with truth and evidence, that is, with propositions that we take
as conclusively established as true or false, as well as others for which only
non-conclusive evidence is available. On the other hand, classical logic gives a
very good, maybe the best possible, account of truth preservation. Thus, we
get a tool for dealing with such contexts of reasoning if we are able to restore
classical logic for propositions for which there is conclusive evidence, that is,
those we want to declare either true or false. If classical logic holds with respect
to such propositions, we may express (with respect to them) the relation of
truth-preservation. What we need is to add to BLE the means of recovering
the properties of classical negation – or, more precisely, we need to restore
the validity of explosion and excluded middle with respect to those formulas
for which we want to recover classical logic. This will be made clear in what
follows.
4.1 Logics of Formal Inconsistency and Undeterminedness
The Logics of Formal Inconsistency (from now on, LFI s), are a family of para-
consistent logics able to express, inside the object language, the notions of ‘non-
explosiveness’, ‘consistency’, or even ‘inconsistency’, as applied to formulas.
This is done by means of adding a unary propositional connective ◦ to the
language, where ◦A means that A is consistent.16
Explosion holds only with respect to propositions marked with ◦, i.e. con-
sistent (in some sense) propositions. Although explosion is not valid simpliciter
in the sense that
for some Γ, A and B : Γ, A,¬A 0 B,
the following always holds:
for every Γ, A and B : Γ, ◦A,A,¬A ` B.
In any paraconsistent logic with few logical resources it cannot be that all
contradictions are logically equivalent, otherwise the principle of explosion would
hold. Indeed, suppose that for any A and B, A ∧ ¬A a` B ∧ ¬B. Then,
A∧¬A ` B∧¬B, and by conjunction-elimination, A∧¬A ` B. Rephrased con-
trapositively, this means that if a logic is paraconsistent, then it has some pairs
16The idea of expressing a metalogical notion within the object language is not new in the
literature. It is found, e.g. in the Cn hierarchy introduced by da Costa [1963], through the
idea of ‘well-behavedness’ of a formula. In da Costa’s hierarchy, however, this is done by
means of a definition: in C1, for instance, it is expressed by A◦, an abbreviation of ¬(A∧¬A),
which makes the ‘well-behavedness’ of A equivalent to saying that A is non-contradictory. On
the other hand, in the LFI s, ◦A is introduced in such a way that allows ◦A and ¬(A ∧ ¬A)
to be logically independent (non-equivalent). The family of LFI s incorporate a wide class of
paraconsistent logics, as shown in Carnielli et al. [2007] and Carnielli and Coniglio [2016].
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of non-equivalent contradictions. This nonequivalence between contradictions
fits the idea that in real-life contexts of reasoning some contradictions are more
relevant than others. In such contexts, information contradicting a proposition
that has been conclusively established as true is immediately rejected as false.
Hence, it seems natural to have a connective able to distinguish ‘different kinds’
of contradictions, separating the contradictions that do not lead to explosion
from those that do.
The idea that leads to the restriction of explosion – separating propositions
into those for which some logical property holds and those for which it does
not – is generalizable. In particular, excluded middle may be restricted in an
analogous way. A Logic of Formal Undeterminedness (LFU ) is a logic such that
its language is extended by a new unary connective 9, where 9A means that A
is (in some sense) determined.17 Excluded middle does not hold, that is
for some Γ, A and B : Γ, A ` B,Γ,¬A ` B but Γ 0 B,
while the following always hold:
for every Γ, A and B : if Γ, A ` B and Γ,¬A ` B, then Γ,9A ` B.
As we have seen above, it cannot be that all contradictions are equivalent in
a paraconsistent logic. Similarly, in a paracomplete logic in which transitivity
and ∨I hold (BLE for example), it cannot be that all instances of A ∨ ¬A are
equivalent, otherwise excluded middle would be unconditionally valid. A proof
of this follows. Let A be any theorem. Since A ` A ∨ ¬A, if for any A and
B, A ∨ ¬A a` B ∨ ¬B, by transitivity it follows that A ` B ∨ ¬B. As A is a
theorem, we conclude ` B ∨ ¬B. This, however, contradicts the definition of a
paracomplete logic.
4.2 The logic LETJ
An LFI and an LFU may be combined in an LFIU – a Logic of Formal Inconsis-
tency and Undeterminedness. In a context that is at the same time paraconsis-
tent and paracomplete, we may recover at once explosion and excluded middle
with respect to a given formula A. Since consistency and determinateness are
recovered simultaneously, we change the symbol 9 to ◦. An LFIU is obtained
by adding the following inference rules to the logic BLE :
◦A A ¬A
B
EXP ◦, ◦A
[A]
....
B
[¬A]
....
B
B
PEM◦.
We call LETJ the logic defined by the addition of EXP
◦ and PEM◦ to BLE.
The name LETJ stands for ‘logic of evidence and truth based on positive intu-
itionistic propositional logic’. The language L1 of LETJ is the language L0 of
17The notion of LFU s is introduced in Marcos [2005].
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BLE plus the unary connective ◦. The definition of the set S1 of formulas of
L1, and the other definitions, are analogous. LETJ enjoys properties P1 to P5
of Lemma 1, and is also a Tarskian logic. Notice that EXP ◦ and PEM◦ may
be considered elimination-rules for ◦, but it is not by accident that there is no
introduction-rule for ◦ (we will return to this point soon).
In LETJ , the connective ◦ works as a classicality operator in the sense that
◦A recovers classical logic for any formula that depends only on A and is formed
with ¬, ∧, → and ∨ (see Fact 18 below). From ‘outside’ of the system, ◦A may
be informally understood as saying that the truth-value of A has been (or may
be) conclusively established. So,
‘◦A ∧A holds’ means ‘A is true’,
‘◦A ∧ ¬A holds’ means ‘A is false’.
It is important to emphasize that the particular way in which the truth or
falsity of a proposition is going to be established is not a problem of logic. Truth
comes from outside the formal system. The latter is no more than a tool that
allows the recovering of classical consequence, and thus truth-preservation, with
respect to some formulas. If classical logic holds for A, it cannot be the case that
there is still conflicting evidence for A and for ¬A. If A has been established as
true, any evidence for ¬A is canceled (mutatis mutandis when A is false).
It is also worth noting that in LETJ classical and paraconsistent logic co-
exist pacifically. ◦ works like an indicator of a context switch: for formulas
marked with ◦ the context is classical, otherwise, the context is paraconsistent
and paracomplete. There is, thus, no rivalry between classical and paracon-
sistent approaches, and this is made possible by the fact that, according to
the proposed interpretation, classic and paraconsistent logics are ‘talking about
different things’.
4.3 A semantics for LETJ
In order to extend the semantics presented in 3.3 to LETJ we need only to add
the clause
9. s(◦A) = 1 implies [s(¬A) = 1 iff s(A) = 0]
to Definition 2. Clause 9 above says that if ◦A holds, we secure classical con-
ditions for negation, but not the converse. Indeed, there may be a valuation
such that s(¬A) = 1 and s(A) = 0 (or vice-versa) but ◦A still does not hold.
Informally, this is understood as saying that there may be evidence only for A,
or only for ¬A, but such evidence is non-conclusive. The semantics so obtained
is sound, complete, and yields a decision procedure for LETJ .
Theorem 11. Soundness and completeness: Γ LETj A iff Γ `LETj A.
Proof. In order to prove completeness, the proof of section 3.3.2 is modified to
include clause 9′ below:
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9′. ◦A ∈ ∆ implies ¬A ∈ ∆ iff A /∈ ∆.
For soundness, it suffices to modify the proof of section 3.3.1, showing that the
rules EXP ◦ and PEM◦ are sound with respect to clause 9 above. Details are
left to the reader.
Theorem 12. Derivability in LETJ is decidable.
Proof. The argument is similar to the proof of the decidability of BLE (Theorem
8). The set Sub∗ is finite, so the number of valuations, and the quasi-matrices,
are also finite. The only difference concerns clause 9 above. All checking pro-
cedures involved are clearly computable. Hence, in view of completeness and
soundness, derivability in LETJ is decidable.
4.4 Some facts about LETJ
The logic LETJ has features that fit the intuitive interpretation based on evi-
dence and truth presented here. We show some of them below.
Fact 13. A bottom particle ⊥ (that is, a formula that by itself trivializes the
system) is definable in LETJ .
Proof. Define ⊥ def= ◦A∧A∧¬A. It can be proved in a few steps that ⊥ ` B
for any B.
Fact 14. LETJ has no trivial models, hence LETJ does not prove ⊥.
Proof. Semantic clause 9 relates ◦ and ¬ in such a way that trivial models are
excluded. In other words, in LETJ there is no valuation v such that for every
formula A of L1, v(A) = 1. As a consequence, given soundness, LETJ does not
prove ⊥, as defined in Fact 13.
The above result is the paraconsistent counterpart of the usual consistency
proofs. Since triviality in paraconsistent logic is not equivalent to freedom from
contradiction, the relevant result, tantamount to proving consistency (as free-
dom from contradiction) when the underlying logic is classical, is to prove that
⊥, or whatever would entail triviality, is not a theorem.
Fact 15. ¬(A∧¬A) and A∨¬A are logically equivalent in LETJ . But neither
of them is logically equivalent to ◦A.
Proof. Since DN (double negation) holds, A ∨ ¬A is equivalent to ¬A ∨ ¬¬A,
and the latter, in its turn, is easily proved to be equivalent to ¬(A ∧ ¬A). In
LETJ , ◦A ` ¬(A∧¬A). Suppose ◦A. So, A∨¬A. The latter implies ¬A∨¬¬A,
which is equivalent to ¬(A ∧ ¬A). To see that neither ¬(A ∧ ¬A) nor A ∨ ¬A
implies ◦A, take v(A) = 1, v(¬A) = 0 and v(◦A) = 0.
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It is worth noting that the above non-equivalence fits the intuitive interpretation
proposed here: it may be the case that ¬(A∧¬A) holds even if ◦A does not hold.
Accordingly, there may be a situation such that there is some non-conclusive
evidence for the truth of A but no evidence for the falsity of A. In this case,
v(¬(A ∧ ¬A)) = 1, although v(◦A) = 0, since the evidence available is non-
conclusive. On the other hand, if v(◦A) = 1, there are only two possibilities:
either v(A) = 1 and v(¬A) = 0, or v(A) = 0 and v(¬A) = 1.
Fact 16. The formulas A∧¬A and ◦(A∧¬A) jointly trivialize the consequence
relation of LETJ .
Proof. A ∧ ¬A implies ¬A. Applying ∨I we get A ∨ ¬A, that is equivalent to
¬(A ∧ ¬A), and triviality follows from Fact 13, since A ∧ ¬A, ◦(A ∧ ¬A) and
¬(A ∧ ¬A) define a bottom particle.
Given that according to the intuitive interpretation proposed here a true contra-
diction is expressed in LETJ by (A∧¬A)∧◦(A∧¬A), the consequence relation
of LETJ trivializes in the presence of a true contradiction. Therefore, Fact 16
implies that LETJ is anti-dialetheist in the sense that it cannot tolerate any
true contradiction.
Fact 17. The logic LETJ does not have any theorem of the form ◦A.
Proof. The strategy of this proof is to show that ◦A is independent of the rules
and therefore cannot be a consequence of the rules of LETJ . Consider for this
purpose the following alternative semantics: for the connectives ∨, ∧, → and
¬, the classical conditions over {0, 1}; for ◦, v(◦A) = 0 for any value of A.
According to this semantics, no rule of LETJ yields a conclusion with value 0 if
all premises have value 1, that is, the rules are sound w.r.t. this new semantics.
On the other hand, a formula ◦A receives 0 for any A. Hence, such a formula
is independent of the rules, and cannot be proved in LETJ .
This result is in accordance with the intuitive idea that the attribution of ◦ to a
formula A may be done only from outside the formal system. It is the user of the
system who establishes under which circumstances a formula may be marked
with ◦. That there is no introduction rule for ◦ is an intentional limitation of
the formal system. What constitutes evidence for a given proposition A, and
whether or not such evidence is conclusive and A may be established as true,
are problems that depend on the specific area of knowledge being dealt with.
These problems must be kept outside the formal system.
Fact 18. If ◦A1, ◦A2, ... ◦An hold, then all formulas that depend only on A1,
A2, ... An and are formed with →, ∧, ∨ and ¬ behave according to classical
logic.
Proof. Let A1, A2, ...An be any formulas and B = φ(A1, A2, ...An) be any com-
posed formula formed by one or more formulas among A1, A2, ...An through
¬, →, ∧ and ∨. We prove below by induction on the complexity of B that if
◦A1, ◦A2, ... ◦An hold, then the rules
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B ¬B
B′ and
[B]
....
B′
[¬B]
....
B′
B′
.
hold. Therefore, all such formulas behave according to classical logic.
Base: B = Ai (for any i). The proof is straightforward.
Inductive step:
Case 1. B = ¬C. We prove PEM. The inductive hypothesis is the rule below:
[C]
....
B′
[¬C]
....
B′
B′
.
In order to prove that
[¬C]
....
B′
[¬¬C]
....
B′
B′
holds, we need only an application of DN. The proof of EXP is left to the reader.
Case 2. B = C ∨D.
We prove EXP. The inductive hypothesis is:
C ¬C
B′ and
D ¬D
B′
.
[C]1
¬(C ∨D)
¬C ¬ ∨ E
B′ i.h.
[D]1
¬(C ∨D)
¬D ¬ ∨ E
B′ i.h. C ∨D
B′
∨E, 1
The proof of PEM and the remaining cases (∧ and→) are left to the reader.
A corollary of Fact 18 is that once a formula A is marked with ◦, no contradiction
is allowed with respect to formulas with ¬, ∨, ∧ and → that depend only on
A. However, from this, it does not follow that any formula that depends only
on A is also marked with ◦. Again, the point is that the attribution of ◦ to
any formula can be done only from outside the formal system. It must always
be a proposition added to the theory at stake by means of non-logical means.
Classicality does not propagate through the connectives.
It is also worth mentioning that a corollary of Fact 18 is a perspicuous
form of a derivability adjustment theorem (DAT ). The purpose of a DAT is to
establish a relationship between two logics in the sense of restoring inferences
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that are lacking in one of them.18 The basic idea is that we have to ‘add some
information’ to the premises in order to restore the inferences that are otherwise
lacking. The general form of a DAT is the following:
For all Γ and B, there is a ∆ such that: Γ `L B iff Γ,∆ `L∗ B.
Suppose that the logic L above is classical logic and L∗ is LETJ . The result
above is tantamount to a DAT that specifies how classical logic may be re-
covered: the ‘information’ required (represented by the set ∆) consists of the
atomic propositions that occur in Γ, marked with ◦.
5 On some issues related to paraconsistency as
preservation of evidence
5.1 A remark on Restall’s approach to logical pluralism
What we have done here clearly indicates an approach to logical pluralism: dif-
ferent accounts of logical consequence may preserve different properties of propo-
sitions. We do not think that logical consequence has to be always identified
with preservation of truth. Thus, classical, paracomplete (e.g. intuitionistic)
and paraconsistent logics may be interpreted as being concerned with preserva-
tion of, respectively, truth, availability of a constructive proof (a notion stronger
than truth) and availability of evidence (a notion weaker than truth).
Restall [2014] presents a proof-theoretic approach to logical pluralism in
terms of different standards of proof based on the duality between paraconsis-
tency and paracompleteness, a point also emphasized by us [see Carnielli and
Rodrigues, 2016]. A detailed analysis of Restall’s arguments is outside the scope
of this text. But his approach differs significantly from ours for two main rea-
sons. First, as much as in Beall and Restall [2006], what is at stake in Restall
[2014] is truth-preservation.19 The same argument can be valid in one sense
and invalid in another, but in both cases truth is the property of propositions
being preserved [Restall, 2014, p. 280]. Second, although interesting from the
technical point of view, Restall’s approach does not seem to be an attempt to
represent inferences accepted in real-life argumentative scenarios.
The dual-intuitionistic logic in Restall [2014] is a paraconsistent logic ob-
tained by restricting inference rules of classical sequent calculus in such a way
that at most one formula occurs in the left hand side of a sequent [Restall,
2014, p. 283]. Restall’s approach sheds light on interesting features of the dual-
ity between paraconsistency and paracompleteness. But it is not clear that the
paraconsistent logic so obtained really intends to correspond to real argumen-
tative contexts. However, this does not make Restall’s dual-intuitionistic logic
18As far as we know, DAT s were proposed for the first time by Batens [1989], but a seed of
this idea may be found in da Costa [1963] and da Costa [1974] [see Carnielli et al., 2007, p.
23].
19The account of logical pluralism given by Beall and Restall [2006] is based on preservation
of truth, but it considers different types of cases: Tarskian models, constructions and situations
that are, respectively, cases for classical, intuitionistic and relevant (i.e. paraconsistent) logics.
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uninteresting; it just makes his approach different from ours. Instead, the ap-
proach to paraconsistency worked out here has tried, from the beginning, to find
a way to interpret contradictions that appear in real-life contexts of reasoning.
From the guiding question what does it mean to accept A and ¬A simultaneously
without accepting their truth? we reached the notion of evidence. The next step
was to find inference rules appropriate to express preservation of evidence.
The view we endorse w.r.t. the duality between paraconsistency and para-
completeness is that logics intended to represent real-life argumentative contexts
have a common core (e.g. PIL) to which dual inference rules (and perhaps some-
thing else) are added. Excluded middle and explosion are dual inference rules in
the sense that anything follows from A∧¬A, while A∨¬A follows from anything
[see Carnielli and Rodrigues, 2016, sec. 2].
5.2 A remark on the problem of ‘just true, just false’
Under the intended interpretation, LETJ is immune to the problem of ‘just
true, just false’, faced by the so-called ‘glut-theorists’ [see, e.g. Beall, 2013]. We
do not need to distinguish a scenario in which a formula A is just true (or just
false) from a scenario in which A is both true and false because the latter is
avoided in the intuitive interpretation proposed here: the simultaneous truth
and falsity of A is expressed by (A∧◦A)∧ (¬A∧◦A), and this formula in LETJ
implies triviality. It may happen that in LETJ A and ¬A hold together, but
only if ◦A does not – and in this case it does not mean that A is both true and
false, but only that there is conflicting evidence w.r.t. A.
It is worth noting, however, that nothing a fortiori prevents the formal
system of LETJ of being interpreted differently, even in a dialetheist way. So,
in such an alternative interpretation, it is remarkable that LETJ would have
the means to solve the problem of ‘just true, just false’ just by assuming that
A ∧ ¬A means that A is both true and false, while ◦A ∧ A (resp. ◦A ∧ ¬A)
means that A is only true (resp. only false).
5.3 Evidence versus constructive falsity
Nelson [1949], extending a proposal of Kleene [1945], suggested a constructive
interpretation for the first-order number theory based on the formal system
N of ‘constructible negation’. Nelson [1959] introduced a paraconsistent sys-
tem called S (not yet the well-known N4 ), and remarked that “In both the
intuitionistic and classical logic all contradictions are equivalent. This makes
it impossible to consider such entities at all in mathematics” [Nelson, 1959, p.
209, our emphasis]. Later, Almukdad and Nelson proposed the logic N−, saying
only that it is “a constructive logic which may be applied to inconsistent subject
matter without necessarily generating a trivial theory” [Almukdad and Nelson,
1984, p. 231]. The difference between N and N− is that explosion does not
hold in the latter, but holds in the former. Following Odintsov [2003, 2008],
the propositional fragments of Nelson’s logics N and N− have been dubbed,
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respectively, as N3 and N4, and the latter became the standard presentation of
Nelson’s paraconsistent logic.
The notion of realizability [Kleene, 1945] can be understood as the formal
side of the BHK interpretation of intuitionistic logic. Since in BHK the idea
of proof is informal, the notion of realizability defines a formal notion of ‘proof’
by appealing to the notion of ‘realizers’ [see Rose, 1953]. The property of
realizability is thus a kind of ‘intuitionistic notion of truth’ for intuitionistic
number-theoretic statements. According to Kleene’s formulation, formulas of
intuitionistic arithmetic are realized by (inductively defined) Go¨del numbers of
constants and of general recursive functions. Nelson [1949] extended Kleene’s
approach, defining both a notion of ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ realizability. The
latter adds a new feature to intuitionistic logic: formulas can also be construc-
tively falsified.20 So, Nelson’s motivation for proposing a constructive negation
was to overcome non-constructive features of the intuitionistic negation. Indeed,
negations in both N3 and N4 satisfy De Morgan’s laws, as well as the following
meta-property:
` ¬(A ∧B) implies ` ¬A or ` ¬B.
It seems plausible, from the constructive viewpoint, that if A ∧ B has been
proved false, then either a proof of the falsity of A or a proof of the falsity
of B is available. The constructive negation of N3 (and, of course, of N4 )
may be also interpreted as refutability [see Lo´pez-Escobar, 1972]. By treating
constructive falsity independently of constructive truth, refutability becomes not
complementary to provability – i.e. constructive falsity does not coincide with
the complement of constructive truth (an ‘asymmetry’ similar to that between
positive and negative evidence).
It is clear, thus, that Nelson was interested in constructive mathematics:
this was the framework in which N3 and N4 were conceived. The motivation
for BLE is quite different. Its inference rules have been established according
to the question posed in Section 3: supposing the availability of evidence for
the premises, we ask whether an inference rule yields a conclusion for which
evidence is available.21 BLE expresses, as we have seen in Section 3, four differ-
ent scenarios corresponding to positive evidence, absence of positive evidence,
negative evidence and absence of negative evidence. On the other hand, the
20In Nelson [1949, p. 17], we read: “This notion of [constructive] truth will be made precise
by defining a syntactical predicate ‘The natural number a P-realizes the formula A.’ At the
same time a correlative concept of constructible falsity will be expressed by a predicate ‘The
natural number a N-realizes the formula A’.”
21The line of reasoning that lead to the logic BLE started in a modification in the logic
mbC, an LFI presented in Carnielli et al. [2007]. mbC is an extension of classical positive
propositional logic, and excluded middle holds in mbC. In order to make mbC suitable for
expressing contradictions as conflicting evidence, we presented in Carnielli and Rodrigues
[2015] the logic mbCD, in which A∨¬A has been replaced by the axiom ◦A→ (A∨¬A), that
corresponds to the rule PEM◦. Then, in the search for a logic that could express preservation
of evidence for both truth and falsity, we adopted the natural deduction system for PIL as
the starting point, thus rejecting A ∨ (A → B), that holds in mbC, and we found out that,
w.r.t. negation, natural deduction rules equivalent to De Morgan’s laws and double negation
should hold, as well as the equivalence between ¬(A→ B) and A∧¬B. The logic so obtained
is LETJ . BLE is LETJ without the rules EXP
◦ and PEM◦.
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similarity between the intended interpretation of BLE and Nelson’s notion of
constructive falsity lies in the fact that the notion of evidence for the falsity of
A is not complementary to the notion of evidence for the truth of A: absence of
evidence for falsity does not count as evidence for truth, and vice-versa. So, the
notion of evidence for falsity is primitive in the sense that it does not coincide
with the complement of evidence for truth.
BLE is not able to express, in the intended intuitive interpretation, a scenario
in which the evidence for A is conclusive. This can be done by LETJ , by means
of the classicality operator: A∧◦A means that A holds and behaves classically.
But in such a case, A is true – mutatis mutandis for the falsity of A, expressed
in LETJ by ¬A ∧ ◦A. That is precisely the point of LETJ : since the formulas
marked with ◦ behave classically, we may say that they are true (or false) and
that there is conclusive evidence for their truth (or falsity). So, in LETJ , if ◦A
holds, the notions of truth and falsity turn out to be complementary: either A
is true, or A is false.
6 Final remarks
We have presented here an approach to paraconsistency that explicitly rejects
dialetheism. According to the intended interpretation of LETJ , true contra-
dictions are not allowed because they imply triviality (see remarks on Fact 16).
There is no way to explain a context of reasoning in which a pair of propositions
A and ¬A simultaneously hold, without being dialetheist or metaphysically neu-
tral, unless a property weaker than truth is attributed to A and ¬A. Our pro-
posal here (our answer to question Q posed in section 1) is that evidence, in the
sense explained in the section 2, may be such a property. Thus, the principle of
explosion is rejected because a circumstance such that there is (non-conclusive)
evidence for both A and ¬A, while there is no evidence for some proposition
B, is completely feasible. This is an epistemic approach since evidence is an
epistemic concept. But we can go one step further and say that our approach to
paraconsistency is radically epistemic because true contradictions are not tol-
erated – as we have seen, they imply triviality as much as they do in classical
logic.
We believe, however, that no philosophical, a priori argument can conclu-
sively confirm or reject the claim that some aspects of reality need contradictory
propositions in order to be described. In fact, ‘real contradictions’ seem to be
quite impossible, but of course we cannot, and do not intend to, prove that.
The intuitive interpretation proposed for the formal system LETJ would fail if
it were confirmed someday that real contradictions do exist. But in such an im-
probable scenario, a considerable part of science, and also of philosophy, would
collapse altogether.
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